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Comments and Casenotes
THE NO PROPERTY RULE IN FEDERAL
TAX LIEN LITIGATION
By SEYMOUR M. TEACH
Since 19501 the United States Government has enjoyed
great success in federal tax lien2 priority contests in which
the United States has asserted its lien against the property
of the taxpayer either before or after another party had
also asserted a lien.' These cases had diminished the
measure of security afforded to lien-holders competing with
the federal tax lien.4 But in 1960 the Supreme Court, in
Aquilino v. United States' and United States v. Durham
Lumber Co., 6 established what has come to be known as the
"no property" rule.7 The rule and the cases decided under
it have matured into what amounts to an exception to the
decisions in the priority cases. Before discussing the rule
1 United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950). In
this case the Supreme Court extended the choateness test, theretofore
applied to the insolvent debtor statute, REv. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C.
§ 191 (1958), to the tax lien statute as well.
2 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6321 provides:
"If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the
same after demand, the amount . . . shall be a lien in favor of the
United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or
personal, belonging to such person." (Emphasis added.)
8 For some of the leading articles in the huge collection of material
written on priority contests see: Anderson, Federal Tao Liens - Their
Nature and Priority, 41 CALiF. L. REv. 241 (1953) ; Kennedy, The Relative
Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate
and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905 (1954) ; Plumb, Federal Tao Collection
and Lien Problems, 13 TAx L. REv. 459 (1958) ; Wolfson, Federal Tao
Liens-A Study in Confusion and Confiscation, 43 MARQ. L. REV. 180 (1959).
' United States v. Vorreiter, 355 U.S. 15 (1957), rev'd per curiam, 134
Colo. 543, 307 P. 2d 475 (1957) ; United States v. White Bear Brewing Co.,
350 U.S. 1010 (1956), rev'd per curiam, 227 F. 2d 359 (7th Cir. 1955);
United States v. Colotta, 350 U.S. 808 (1955), rev'd per curiam, 224 Miss. 33,
79 So. 2d 474 (1955) ; United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955) ; United
States v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. 0o., 348 U.S. 215 (1955);
United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955); United States v. City of New
Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954) ; United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345
U.S. 361 (1953) ; United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S.
47 (1950); Illinois e rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946);
United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945).
'363 U.S. 509 (1960).
'363 U.S. 522 (1960).
For a case referring to it as the "no debt" theory, see Wolverine
Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 165 F. Supp. 335 (N.D. Iowa 1958). It was called
the "residue" rule by (the same district three years later. Randall v.
Colby, 190 F. Supp. 319 (N.D. Iowa 1961). For a law review article citing
it as the "no property" theory see Note, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 212 (1960-61).
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and its ramifications, a brief look at the priority cases is in
order to fully appreciate the importance of the no prop-
erty rule.
I. THE PRIORITY CONTESTS
The federal tax lien8 has no built-in priority. Congress
left it to the courts to determine the factors to be con-
sidered when a federal lien conflicted with a lien of another
party. In United States v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank,'
the first priority case decided by the Supreme Court, the
tax lien was asserted against a local attachment lien which
arose prior to the time notice of the tax lien was filed but
on which no judgment was obtained until after the tax lien
was filed. The Court stated that when a state-created lien
competes with a federal tax lien, federal law controls and
state classification of a state-created lien becomes subject
to re-examination by the Supreme Court under federal law.
After establishing this principle, the Court adopted the
choateness test and held that the attachment lien was in-
choate at the time the tax lien arose, with the result that
the federal tax lien took priority.
It was not until United States v. City of New Britain10
that the Supreme Court specified the elements of the choate-
ness test. There, the federal tax lien was competing with
city liens for real estate taxes and water rents. Almost inci-
dentally the Court specified the elements of a choate or per-
fected lien, which was said to exist "when the identity of
the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the amount
of the lien are established."" The Court also introduced
"the first in time, first in right" principle.12 Applying these
two rules, the Court found that certain of the city's liens
became choate before the tax lien arose and were prior to
the federal tax lien. The Court did not apply the choate-
ness test to the federal tax lien, treating it as perfected as
soon as the assessment lists were filed. It remanded the
case to the state court to decide the priorities in the light
of the principles established. Significantly, New Britain
remains one of the few Supreme Court cases in which a
8For a good discussion of the mechanics of the lien see Mosner, The
Nature and Scope of Federal Taw Liens With A Special Consideration of
Their Effect on Mortgage Foreclosures, 17 MD. L. Rv. 1 (1957).
340 U.S. 47 (1950).
10347 U.S. 81 (1954).
11Id. at 84.
1'2Id. at 85.
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competing lien was held choate and prior to a federal tax
lien under the "first in time"'3 principle.
After New Britain, the Supreme Court consistently
denied mechanic's liens 4 the standing they had previously
been given in federal tax lien contests. In United States v.
Vorreiter, 5 United States v. White Bear Brewing Co.16 and
United States v. Colotta,17 the Supreme Court refused state
court characterization of local liens, 8 creating the impres-
sion that a mechanic's lien which falls short of judgment
could not become choate to defeat a tax lien. After these
cases, it might have been concluded that to defeat the tax
lien, a lienor would have had to qualify as a judgment
creditor or under one of the other three exceptions of sec-
tion 6323 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
The next two priority cases to reach the Supreme Court
resulted in an extension of the choateness test to con-
tractual liens. In United States v. Ball Construction Co.,9
involving an assignment of accounts to become due, the
assignee's lien was determined to be inchoate. In Crest
Finance Co. v. United States,2 0 the Solicitor General con-
ceded the choateness of the assignee's lien. In its latest pro-
nouncement in the priority area, United States v. Pioneer
American Insurance Co., 21 the Court attempted to ration-
alize the Ball and Crest cases on the factual differences be-
tween the assignment involved, pointing out that a lien
base on an assignment to secure future indebtedness can-
13 The Court handed down three priority opinions in 1955 in which the
local lienholders could not satisfy the elements of choateness. United States
v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 215 (1955), involved a
garnishment lien; United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955), an attachment
lien; and United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955), a distress lien for
rent. Two recent decisions subordinating the tax lien are Crest Finance
Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 347 (1961); and U.S. v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351
(1964). See also U.S. v. Pioneer Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963).
14 See Note, 68 YAL L.J. 138 (1958), for a comprehensive discussion of
the mechanic's lien laws of the various states.
"355 U.S. 15, rei'd per curiam, 134 Colo. 543, 307 P. 2d 475 (1957).
- 350 U.S. 1010 (1956), rev'd per curiam, 227 F. 2d 359 (7th Cir. 1955).
17350 U.S. 808, rev'd per curiam, 224 Miss. 33, 79 So. 2d 474 (1955).
18 Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems, 13 TAX L. Rav. 459,
505 (1958), points to a contemporaneous state court opinion as best repre-
senting the reasoning of the 'Supreme Court at this time. Fleming v.
Brownfield, 47 Wash. 2d 857, 290 P. 2d 993 (1955), where the Supreme Court
of Washington found a mechanic's lien failed to reach federal standards.
1355 U.S. 587 (1958), rev'd per curiam, 239 F. 2d 384 (5th Cir. 1956),
affd mem., sub nora., R. F. Ball Constr. Co. v. Jacobs, 140 F. Supp. 60
(W.D. Tex. 1956). For a recent discussion of this case and its aftermath
see Note, Federal Priorities and Tax Liens, 63 COLUm. L. Rav. 1259,
1280-81 (1963).
20368 U.S. 347 (1961), v"cated per curiam, 291 F. 2d 1 (7th Cir. 1961).
Note, 63 COLUM. L. REav. 1259, 1281, supra note 19.
21374 U.S. 84 (1963). See also United States v. Buffalo Say. Bank, 371
U.S. 228 (1963), where the federal tax lien was given priority over a lien
for local taxes in a foreclosure sale.
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not be choate and prior to a federal tax lien, but that an
assignment consummated prior to the accrual and filing of
the federal lien can satisfy the choateness test.2"
Although some doubt remains as to the applicability of
the priority rules to particular facts, it can be said that a
competing lien is prior to a federal tax lien if it meets the
choateness and "first in time" tests. An alternative way
of defeating the federal tax lien is through the no property
rule, to which we now turn.
II. THE No PROPERTY RULE
The no property rule is best understood by assuming a
hypothetical but typical situation in the construction indus-
try, where its application most often arises. The taxpayer
is a general contractor who has completed the work for the
owner but has failed to pay all of his subcontractors. He is
also indebted to the United States for unpaid taxes. The
owner has not paid the full contract price, but has retained
a percentage13 of that amount. The subcontractors ask the
owner to pay them, usually filing or threatening to file their
mechanic's liens against the owner's property. The Govern-
ment asserts its tax lien on all the "property and rights to
property"24 of the contractor. At this point the main dis-
tinction from a priority case becomes apparent. Two com-
peting liens have been asserted against two different par-
ties. In the priority cases, liens are asserted against the
property of only one party because he is both the taxpayer
and the person holding property which the other lien-
holders are after. In a no property case, the Government
seeks to enforce its lien, normally by notice of levy, against
property held by one other than the taxpayer.
This situation gives rise to the vital question which
underlies a no property case, whether it be in the construc-
tion field or in others: Is there any debt owing to the tax-
payer to which the Government's lien can attach? If there
is no such debt, the Government has no lien, and it is im-
material whether or not the subcontractor has a choate lien
at the time the Government asserts the tax lien.
In the construction area, the no property situation exists
when the taxpayer-contractor has lost his contractual right
22 Id. at 91.
2, On state jobs the state might have a statutory requirement that fifteen
percent be retained. N.Y. STATE ThN. LAW § 139 (Supp. 1958). See 5 MD.
CODE art. 63, § 13 (1957). In Maryland the owner isn't authorized to retain
anything from the contract price until he receives notice of a claim from a
subcontractor. But on private jobs in Maryland the practice is for the
owner (to retain a percentage of the contract price, usually fifteen percent.
24 See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6321.
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to claim the unpaid balance which the owner holds and
which the Government seeks to collect.
The first significant exposition of the no property rule
appeared in a Second Circuit decision, Fidelity & Deposit
Co. v. New York City Housing Auth.25 The contractor had
completed the installation of heating and ventillating facili-
ties but failed to pay his laborers and materialmen. The
Government filed a tax lien on the property of the contrac-
tor-taxpayer. Under his contract, the contractor was re-
quired to supply a payment and performance bond to the
owner, the Housing Authority. Fidelity, who was surety on
this bond, paid the laborers and materialmen what the con-
tractor owed on the job and claimed the entire unpaid bal-
ance held by the owner. The district court" held in favor
of the United States. The Court of Appeals reversed and
found that the contractor had no property rights under the
contract with the owner in the retained balance to which
the tax lien could attach. The court, looking to New York
contract law,27 construed the contractor's failure to pay his
materialmen and laborers as a breach of the contract de-
priving the contractor of his property rights in the contract
balance. Since the Government's lien failed to attach, the
Circuit Court remanded the case to the district court to
reconsider the surety's claim.
The Second Circuit's opinion rested mainly on New
York contract law, but it launched into a discussion of the
relationship between state law and the federal tax lien. At
the center of this discussion was the Supreme Court's
opinion in Morgan v. Commissioner,8 in which the Court
25241 F. 2d 142 (2d Cir. 1957). See Note, 66 YALE L.J. 797, 801 (1957),
for a critical opinion of the case by a writer more concerned with the
uniform administration of the tax laws than with the development of the
no property rule. The "uniformity" argument is often met in the tax col-
lection area. The dissenting opinion in Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39
(1958), is a clear statement of it. For some development leading up to the
New York Housing decision see Karno-Smith Co. v. Maloney, 112 P. 2d 690
(3d Cir. 1940) ; United States v. Western Union Telegraph Oo., 50 F. 2d 102
(2d Cir. 1931); United States F. & G. Co. v. Triborough Bridge Authority,
297 N.Y. 31, 74 N.E. 2d 226 (1947).
211140 F. Supp. 298 (S.D. N.Y. 1956). The court held that the contractor
had a conditional right to the fund which qualified as a "right to property"
under Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3670 now INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6321.
27 United States F. & G. Co. v. Triborough Bridge Authority, 297 N.Y. 31,
74 N.E. 2d 226 (1947), was a no property case where the New York Court of
Appeals declared that a failure by a contractor to pay hie mechanics was
as much a default of the contract with the owner as was not completing
the work.
1 309 U.S. 78 (1940). In this case the question appeared to be whether
a power of appointment granted to the deceased taxpayer was general or
special under Wisconsin law for the purpose of taxing It to the taxpayer's
estate under the federal revenue act. The Supreme Court stated that it was
1964] FEDERAL TAX LIEN LITIGATION 315
expounded the well-recognized principle that "[S]tate law
creates legal interests and rights."29 However, the Court
went on to say, "If it is found in a given case that an interest
or right created by local law was the object intended to be
taxed, the federal law must prevail no matter what name
is given to the interest or right by state law. '3 0 The circuit
court pointed out that the Supreme Court had recognized
this distinction in the lien priority cases but that there had
been no doubt in those cases that the taxpayer had some
interest in the disputed property to which the tax lien could
attach and that the question involved had been solely one
of priorities."
In 1958 the Supreme Court heard its first no property
case in United States v. Bess.2 This was a case where the
property in question was the proceeds of the taxpayer's life
insurance policy. The Court cited New York Housing3 for
the proposition that state law creates property rights, but
the Court went on to add that the federal lien statute
"creates no property rights but merely attaches conse-
quences, federally defined, to rights created under state
law." 4 It held that the tax lien could not attach to the pro-
unnecessary to resolve the issue of how the state law would characterize
the power, holding that 'the power was general within the intent of the
revenue act.
29 Id. at 80.
10 Id. at 81. As will be evident later, this distinction is the basis for
victory by the Government in the lien priority area and defeat in the no
property cases.
1 Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. New York Housing Auth., 241 F. 2d 142, 145
(2d Cir. 1957). The court denied the argument that substantial perform-
ance by the contractor gave him the right to sue for the retained fund. The
Government also argued that the contract only required that the material-
men "somehow" be paid, not necessarily by the contractor. The court held
there was a condition precedent that the contractor be the one to pay them.
32 357 U.S. 51 (1958). The Government asserted its lien against a policy
taken out by the deceased taxpayer on which he had paid all the premiums.
The Government sought to collect the proceeds of the policy paid to the
beneficiary, but the Court limited it to the cash surrender value of the
policy. It held the taxpayer had no property interest in the proceeds of
the policy under state law during his lifetime so the federal lien couldn't
attach. But he did have the right to borrow against the cash surrender
value of the policy. The Court found this to be a chose in action which
qualified as "property" or "rights to property" within the statute. While
looking to state law to construe the taxpayer's interest under the policy, the
Court disregarded the fact that under state law the beneficiary of a policy
was free of the claims of creditors of the insured except to the extent of
the amount of any premiums paid in fraud of creditors. In a companion
case, Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958), the Court treated the
Government the same as an ordinary creditor of the insured under state
law and barred the tax lien from attaching. The different decisions are
rightly justified by the fact that a state law in Be88 made the insured's
right to borrow on the cash surrender value a property interest, while no
such law existed in Stern.
83 Id. at 55.
84 Ibid.
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ceeds of the policy since, under state law, the taxpayer-
insured had no property interest in the proceeds. But, said
the Court, the lien could attach to the cash surrender value
since the taxpayer could have borrowed up to its full value
in his lifetime. Considering the Government's unusual per-
suasiveness in the priority cases, Bess foreshadowed the
result in Aquilino v. United States3 5 and United States v.
Durham Lumber Co. 6 in 1960.
In Aquilino the contractor agreed to remodel a restau-
rant. He hired various subcontractors who performed their
contracts but were not paid. They filed mechanic's liens
against the balance of the main contract which had been
retained by the owner. The United States had filed its
assessment lists against the contractor, thereby perfecting
its lien, even before he had entered into the main contract.
This appeared to create the strongest possible priority case
for the Government. Not only could it claim "first in time
is first in right" but it could also stand on the expected
inchoateness of the competing state liens under the priority
cases. Before the New York Court of Appeals," the sub-
contractors tried to distinguish their case from the lien
priority cases by pointing out that the tax lien was not be-
ing asserted against any real property owned by or possibly
owned by the taxpayer. They also asserted that under the
state lien law the contractor had no property interest in
the fund and that under the trust fund provisions of the
state's lien law the court would be justified in not applying
the choateness test. If this argument were accepted, the
taxpayer would have "no property" in the contract balance
to which the tax lien could attach with the result that reli-
ance on the "first in time" rule would also be unjustified.
The New York Court of Appeals treated the case as a
priority contest nonetheless and refused to construe the
trust fund provisions in a manner to "defeat the paramount
right of the United States to levy and collect taxes uni-
"363 U.S. 509 (1960).
a363 U.S. 522 (1960).
37 Aquilino v. United States, 3 N.Y. 2d 511, 146 N.E. 2d 774, 169 N.Y.S.
2d 9 (1957).
11 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1930, ch. 859, § 18. The section provided in part: "The
funds received by a contractor from an owner for the improvement of real
property are hereby declared to constitute trust funds in the hands of such
contractor to be applied first to the payment of claims of subcontractors,
architects, engineers, surveyors, laborers and materialmen arising out of
the improvement." The section also provided that any person entitled to
share in the fund may enforce the trust by civil action. Diversion of such
funds by the general contractor is declared to constitute larceny.
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formly throughout the land."39 It held the federal lien
had priority.
When Aquilino ° was argued before the Supreme Court,
the subcontractors were successful in distinguishing their
case from the prior mechanic's lien contests the Court had
considered. The Court began its opinion by stating:
"The threshold question in this case, as in all cases
where the Federal Government asserts its tax lien, is
whether and to what extent the taxpayer had 'property'
or 'rights to property' to which the tax lien could
attach."4 1
This was the first of a three-step process the Court was to
go through in order to establish the no property rule. This
first step was a statement of the prerequisite for the tax lien
to attach. The Court next cited Morgan v. Commissioner42
for the proposition that property interests are created under
state law, a proposition which fitted neatly into the terms
of tax lien statute.43 Finally, it cited United States v. Bess,44
which reiterated that the tax lien statute itself did not
create any property interests. The Court concluded that
the priority question need not be reached at all. After the
Court completed its no property thesis, it recognized the
priority decisions which it had already implicitly distin-
guished. The Court proceeded to remand the case to the
state court to resolve the question of the nature of the
property right of the taxpayer. 5
In Durham,6 the contractor had agreed to construct
several buildings for the owner. He hired various sub-
31 Aquilino v. United States, 3 N.Y. 2d 511, 146 N.E. 2d 774, 777, 169 N.Y.S.
2d 9 (1957). One writer has implied that had the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958), been handed down at the time
of Aquilino the New York Court of Appeals might have decided the case
differently. Note, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1316, 1324 (1961).
40 363 U.S. 509 (1960).
41 Id. at 512.
42309 U.S. 78 (194).
43 This definition of property rights under state law was not so well en-
trenched that the Government did not advocate a federal definition of
property. It suggested that future decisions would supply content to such
a body of law. The Court rejected the argument, standing on its decisions
in Morgan and Bess rather than usurp the role of the states which were
already incensed Over the priority cases. The latter had refused recognition
to state characterization of property interests.
44 357 U.S. 51 (1958). See Note, Property Subject to the Federal Tam
Lien. 77 HARV. L. REv. 1485 (1964).
45 In Aquilino v. United States, 10 N.Y. 2d 271, 176 N.E. 2d 826, 219 N.Y.S.
2d 254 (1961), the New York Court of Appeals held on remand that the
taxpayer did not have sufficient equitable interest in the fund in the owner's
hands to give him a property right. It characterized the subcontractors as
the beneficiaries of a true trust rather than mere lienors.
,( United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 257 F. 2d 570 (4th Cir. 1958).
1964] 317
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contractors who completed their jobs but were not paid.
They filed notices of their claims with the owner, but
before the subcontractor filed their notices the tax lien was
filed against the contractor. Two of the subcontractors
brought suit to reach the unpaid balance on the main con-
tract. They did not attempt to attain choateness by claim-
ing an ordinary mechanic's lien. However, they were able
to persuade the Fourth Circuit to put aside the priority
cases and recognize that it was confronted with a different
situation, one calling for an examination of the nature of
the right of the subcontractor, as asserted in North Caro-
lina, against the owner of the improved property.47 The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals examined the North
Carolina statutes and concluded that a subcontractor who
notifies an owner of his claim has a lien upon the improved
real estate and an independent cause of action against the
owner in his own right. The court also noted that the
owner cannot avoid or reduce his direct liability by pay-
ment or settlement with the general contractor.8 Because
of this independent right of action in a subcontractor who
has filed notice, the court held that the contractor was left
without property to which the tax lien might attach. Fur-
ther it distinguished the case before it from the priority
cases on the facts as well as on the lien statute involved.
It refused to extend the priority of a tax lien asserted
against the taxpayer's property to the property of the tax-
payer's debtor. The court cited the New York Housing
case49 as authority for its no property holding and chided
the New York Court of Appeals for not being aware of
the decision of the Second Circuit. Finally the court
adopted the holding in United States v. Bess"° to bolster its
conclusion.
In deciding Durham,51 the Supreme Court merely
affirmed the strong opinion of the Fourth Circuit as to the
effect of the North Carolina statutes on the subcontractor's
claim and agreed that the lien statute created a no property
situation which warranted avoidance of any priority claim.
Subsequent to these two decisions, other courts have
looked favorably on the no property doctrine. This was to
be expected in the light of the unpopularity of the priority
decisions.
'7 Id. at 572.
1 "Id. at 573, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44-46, 44-48, 44-49 (1950).
9 241 F. 2d 142 (2d Cir. 1957).
50 357 U.S. 51 (1958). The circuit court also stated that had the New
York Court of Appeals had the benefit of Bes8, it would have adopted a
contrary stand in Aquilino.
51363 U.S. 522 (1960).
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In discussing these recent cases it is necessary to dis-
tinguish between the contractual interpretation cases 52 and
those involving application of lien statutes." Three of the
latter have involved the mechanic's lien statutes of Indiana,
Iowa 5 4 and Washington, 55 each holding that the lienholder
had a direct and independent claim against the contract
balance retained by the owner.
In United States v. Chapman,56 the Tenth Circuit, citing
both Aquilino and Durham, found it could not rely on the
Oklahoma lien statute because it contained no provision
similar to that of New York or North Carolina. However,
the court concluded that the absence of such statute did not
preclude application of the no property rule because the
contract involved contained a condition precedent to pay-
ment of the balance, whereas the obligations to the tax-
payers in Aquilino and Durham appeared to be absolute.
As an alternative basis for its decision, the court looked to
Oklahoma contract law to construe the condition in the
contract for payment of the mechanic's claims and held
against the Government on the ground that, under the con-
tract, the owner was not obligated to pay the balance to the
taxpayer. By the same token, in Fidelity and Casualty
Company of New York v. Dykstra,57 a subrogating surety
competing with the Government used the contract argu-
ment to its fullest extent by persuading the federal district
court to rely on Minnesota contract law and the New York
Housing s and United States F. & G. Co. v. Triborough
Bridge Authority59 cases as its basis for the decision that
the tax lien would not attach.
52 Examples already looked at prior to Aquilino and Durham are Fidelity
& Deposit Co. v. New York Housing Auth., 241 F. 2d 142 (2d Cir. 1957) ;
United States F. & G. Co. v. Triborough Bridge Authority, 297 N.Y. 31,
74 N.E. 2d 226 (1947).
58 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1930, ch. 859, § 18; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44-6, 44-8, 44-9
(1950).
54 Community School District of Eldora v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co.
of Des Moines, 194 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Iowa 1961). The Iown lien statute
is contained in IOWA CODE, ch. 573 (1958). It requires that all public cor-
porations retain at least ten percent of the contract price for the benefit
of unpaid laborers and materialmen.
55 Johnson Service Company v. Roush, 57 Wash. 2d 80, 355 P. 2d 815
(1960).
" 281 F. 2d 862 (10th Cir. 1960). For two other recent no property
decisions see Capital Fire & Casualty Co. v. City of Birmingham, Ala., 10
Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 5967 (1962) ; Randall v. Colby, 190 F. Supp. 319 (N.D.
Iowa 1961).
" 208 F. Supp. 717, 722 (D. Minn. 1962).
18 241 F. 2d 142 (2d Cir. 1957).
61 297 N.Y. 31, 74 N.E. 2d 226 (1947).
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III. OTHm APPLICATIONS OF THE RULe
In Aquilino and Durham the Supreme Court established
the no property rule in the construction area where it is
normally a mechanic's lienholder who is competing with
the federal tax lien. Prior to these cases it had been decided
that the no property rule could be applied where the pro-
ceeds of an insurance policy" were contested, rather than
the balance of a construction contract. With these cases as
authority for the rule that state law must be looked to as
the source of property rights, the courts have broadened the
application of the no property rule.
In Karno-Smith Co. v. Maloney6l the taxpayer, a sub-
contractor, failed to pay his supplier. Following the sub-
contractor's default the contractor paid the subcontractor's
debt to the supplier, as was required in the contractor's
bond with the owner. When the United States asserted its
tax lien against the balance of the subcontract held by the
contractor, the court allowed the contractor to set-off
against this fund to the extent he had covered the debt of
the subcontractor. This resulted in no property being left
in the subcontractor to which the federal lien could attach.
In United States v. Winnett 2 a debtor contracted to
make good on the notes of his creditor given to a bank. The
contract provided for set-off by the debtor against his debt
to the creditor should he have to cover the latter's notes.
A federal tax lien was filed against the creditor. Subse-
quently he defaulted on his notes and the debtor paid the
bank what was due. When the Government tried to collect
from the debtor the amount of his original debt to the
creditor, the Ninth Circuit looked to state law to determine
the property interests of the taxpayer-creditor and the effect
of the set-off contract and held the set-off related back to
the date of the set-off agreement, which preceded the tax
lien. The result was that the property was no longer that
of the taxpayer and the lien failed to attach.63
61 United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958) ; Commissioner v. Stern, 357
U.S. 39 (1958) ; See Riesenfeld, Life Insurance and Creditors' Remedies
in the United States, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 583 (1956-57).
" 112 F. 2d 690 (3d Cir. 1940).
62 165 F. 2d 149 (9th Cir. 1947).
61 Cf. United States v. Bank of the United States, 5 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.
N.Y. 1934), where a situation comparable to a set-off arose. The Govern-
ment tried to satisfy its lien from the balance of the taxpayer's checking
account. Before the lien arose the taxpayer had become liable to the bank
on a demand note. In the contest between the Government and the bank
the court found no property in the taxpayer. The depositor was said to
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The no property rule has also been applied in the bank-
ruptcy field. In the only case in Maryland approaching
the no property point, the Maryland Court of Appeals
denied arguments of a trustee in bankruptcy who was
trying to assume the position of the United States as lien-
holder under section 70(e) of the Bankruptcy Act in order
to set aside an unrecorded chattel mortgage and its fore-
closure. In Wethered v. Alban Tractor Co.64 the bankrupt
had given a chattel mortgage on construction machinery.
The trustee in bankruptcy was seeking to recover the pro-
ceeds from the subsequent chattel mortgage foreclosure
sale. The chattel had been sold for cash in full and de-
livered to a bona fide purchaser twenty-six days before
the first notice of the federal tax lien was filed against the
bankrupt. The court held that under Maryland law pay-
ment and delivery are all that is needed to vest legal title
in the bona fide purchaser, with the result that there was
no property left in the bankrupt for the lien to attach and
the trustee could not assume the position of such a lien-
holder under section 70 (e) .*5
In a Second Circuit decision 6 an assignment for the
benefit of creditors under New York law was upheld against
the Governor's claim of priority for a tax lien under sec-
tion 67 (b) of the Bankruptcy Act. Since the assignment
had been perfected under state law prior to the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy, a no property situation existed
when the Government filed its lien against the bankrupt.
An application of the no property rule in the field of
trusts arose in a case involving the unique features of the
"Illinois land trust" ,67 which vests both legal and equitable
title in the trustee. After the taxpayer placed the real
estate in question under the trust, the tax lien was filed.
In a state where this type of trust has found great favor,
have only a revocable license to make deposits and withdrawals, and when
the bank asserted its interest under the demand note the taxpayer was left
with nothing to which the lien could attach. See also Beeghly v. Wilson,
152 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Iowa 1957), where the set-off arose under a contract
provision but the tax lien was granted priority.
"+ -4- Md. 408, 168 A. 2d 363 (1961). For other aspects of this case see
O'Toole Tire Co. v. Gaither, Inc., 216 Md. 54, 139 A. 2d 252 (1958) ; Plaza
Corp. v. Alban, 219 Md. 570, 151 A. 2d 170 (1958).
5 The court also turned down an argument of the trustee under § 70(c)
of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 556 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1953), since
the bankruptcy petition had not been filed until sixteen months after the
chattels were sold.
"City of New York v. United Staltes, 283 F. 2d 829 (2d Cir. 1960). In
upholding the New York law and the no property rule the court concluded
that the Bankruptcy Act had not superseded the effect of the New York
property law.
67 Chicago Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Cacciatore, 33 Ill. App. 2d 888,
178 N.E. 2d 888 (1961).
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the Government tried to avoid the effect of Illinois law
sanctioning this trust. The Illinois Court, however, em-
ployed the rule laid down in Aquilino and Durham and
held the trust property to be immune from the lien.
IV. THE No PROPERTY RULE IN THE
CONSTRUCTION AREA
The variety of situations in which the rule has been
applied indicates the breadth of its application. It remains
for the courts to indicate how far the rule may be extended.
However, in the construction area the way is clear to use
the no property rule as now developed.
Essential to an effective application of the rule is a
recognition of the two ways a no property situation arises
in this area, namely, contract stipulation and state lien law.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Aquilino and Durham
point the way for state legislatures to enact statutes similar
to the New York and North Carolina statutes.68 Along
these lines, it is noteworthy that Maryland's mechanic's
lien statute allows a subcontractor to assert a lien for the
full value of his claim without regard to the amount due
the general contractor.69 However, this liberal construc-
tion of the statute has not been extended to allow the
enforcement of a mechanic's claim by direct action against
the owner, as in Durham. One writer has expressed the
opinion that the Maryland statute will never be construed
to be of the type the Supreme Court dealt with in either
Aquilino or Durham.7" In view of the equitable considera-
tions favoring an unpaid mechanic and the influence of
the no property cases, the Maryland statute7 arguably
could be read to be of the Durham type.
To further the policy of the mechanics lien statutes,
each state could amend its statute to come within the
Durham decision. The doctrine of Fidelity & Deposit Co. v.
New York Housing Authority72 offers an alternative solu-
68 The advisability bf such a move by the states in any significant number
is disapproved of on the ground that Congress would not stand by watching
its tax revenue vanish. Baldinger, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Affect-
ing Federal TaT Liens, 27 J.B.A.D.C. 351, 354 (1960). The practicality of
states trying to alter their present lien laws to take advantage of the
Supreme Court's rulings is doubted also. Shanks, The Tan Lien Tamed,
8 U.C.L.A.L. R-v. 339 (1960-61).
"
0 MD. ANN. CODE art 63, § 1 (1957), as amended, chs. 646 and 734,
Acts 1959.
70 Baldinger, supra note 68, at 355.
71 MD. ANN. CODE art. 63, § 13 (1957).
71241 F. 2d 142 (2d Cir. 1957). See Note, Competing Mechanics and
Federal Tan Liens: Conflicts Triggered By a General Contractor's Default,
68 YAxn L.J. 985, 999 (1959), for an excellent discussion of this suggestion
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tion. In that case, the court interpreted the failure to pay
materialmen or subcontractors as a default by the con-
tractor under the primary contract. Some courts78 have
gone so far as to infer such a condition in a construction
contract where subcontractors remain unpaid. Rather than
relying on the possible implied terms, the owner can insert
in the construction contract a condition precedent clause
which clearly states that failure of the contractor to pay
his laborers, materialmen and subcontractors shall be a
breach of the main contract.74  With such a clause in the
contract, the Government's tax lien would be inferior to the
owner's right to pay the retained funds to discharge any
mechanic's lien. 5
AMORTIZATION OF NON-CONFORMING USES
By ALLAN T. FELL
I. LEGAL CoNSIDmERATION
The power of a municipality to pass reasonable zoning
ordinances was firmly established in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.,' which settled the controversy over
prospective regulation of undeveloped land but left unre-
solved the problem of how to deal with previously exist-
ing non-conforming uses, which were believed to be entitled
to constitutional protection.2
where the author criticizes the Fourth Circuit for deciding Durham on the
peculiar lien provisions instead of taking the approach of New York
Housing, which was also open to it under the construction contract.7 3 Capital Fire & Casualty Co. v. City of Birmingham, 10 Am. Fed. Tax
R. 2d 5967 (1962) ; F. H. McGraw & Co. v. Sherman Plastering Co., 60 F.
Supp. 504, 512 (D. Conn. 1943).
7' The American Institute of Architects is the leading authority which
promulgates standard contract forms in the construction industry. PaKER
& ADAMS, THE AIA STANDARD CONTRACT FORMS AND T-m LAW (1954). See
Art. 9, at p. 30 and Art. 32, at p. 50, for the language used in the standard
contract relevant to the right of mechanics to be paid as against a federal
tax lien.
75 Although the owner is protected, unless a mechanic's lien is perfected
or the contract or state law requires the owner to pay the materialmen and
subcontractors from the retained funds, the tax lien may still prevail.
Compare two recent cases, Fine Fashions, Inc. v. United States, 328 F. 2d
419, 421-22 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Youngstown S. & T. Co. v. Patterson-Emerson-
Comstock of Ind., 227 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Ind. 1963).
1272 U.S. 365 (1926). For an excellent discussion of this case see Reno,
Non-Euclidean Zoning: The Use of the Floating Zone, 23 MD. L. REv. 105
(1963). See also Trager, Contract Zoning, 23 MD. L. REv. 121 (1963).
2Board of Zoning Appeals of Howard County v. Meyer, 207 Md. 389,
114 A. 2d 626 (1955) ; Higgins v. City of Baltimore, 206 Md. 89, 110 A. 2d
503 (1955).
